{
  "id": "arcus-subaccount-withdrawals",
  "url": "https://ohshit.app/incidents/arcus-subaccount-withdrawals/",
  "title": "Arcus subaccount accounting bug enabled a 2,234,391 USDG withdrawal",
  "level": 4,
  "level_name": "septic-tank-blew",
  "date": "2026-11-10",
  "date_is_approximate": false,
  "updated": "2026-11-13",
  "tags": [
    "DeFi",
    "Arcus",
    "accounting"
  ],
  "ecosystems": [],
  "summary": "Arcus says a newly created account inflated its recorded balance through transfers between its own subaccounts. It withdrew 2,234,391 USDG. The bridge held another roughly $3 million in requests, which were reversed. Arcus covered the shortfall from its treasury.",
  "splash": "Arcus exchange accounting for transfers between subaccounts. Arcus reports one exploiting account and no affected user balances.",
  "wipe": "Verify account activity and the official recovery status. Exchanges should review transfers involving the address Arcus disclosed.",
  "in_the_wild": "yes",
  "source_exception": null,
  "cves": [],
  "fixed": [],
  "checklist": [
    {
      "title": "Review account activity through the official interface",
      "hint": "Compare balances, positions, orders and withdrawals with your records. If anything differs, preserve the transaction identifiers and contact official Arcus support."
    },
    {
      "title": "Monitor the address disclosed by Arcus",
      "hint": "Exchanges and service providers should review transfers linked to 0xeFbf442599310E5CeE1A4EDd5c66334c5f30b3Dd. Use the Key Addresses and Key Transactions tables in the CertiK report to compare bridge contracts and transaction hashes. Confirm an executed payout and its recipient before taking action. A match alone does not establish wallet ownership."
    },
    {
      "title": "Verify any recovery claim through Arcus",
      "hint": "Users should never send funds, sign transactions or share credentials in response to messages about this offer. Exchange teams should corroborate addresses and transfers with official Arcus information and current on-chain records before acting."
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "name": "Arcus Labs incident report",
      "url": "https://arcus.xyz/blog/arcus-incident-report-november-9-2026",
      "says": "Confirms the accounting path, withdrawn funds, blocked requests, service restoration, treasury coverage and initial address.",
      "primary": true
    },
    {
      "name": "Ethereum Safe transaction carrying the return offer",
      "url": "https://eth.blockscout.com/tx/0x36626c180029341a89ead3420d8fa56abac8639759db184c78fbf89bd2e651f5",
      "says": "The November 11 Safe transaction records message data addressed to the wallet disclosed by Arcus and two other addresses, including the proposed terms and deadline.",
      "primary": true
    },
    {
      "name": "blockintAI original Arcus tracing report",
      "url": "https://blockint.ai/blog/arcus-perps-exploit-robinhood-chain-relay-dai-btc-trail",
      "says": "Traces nine USDG withdrawals totaling 2,234,391 USDG and their subsequent cross-chain movement and identifies the Safe transaction carrying the offer.",
      "primary": true
    },
    {
      "name": "CertiK original Arcus analysis",
      "url": "https://www.certik.com/blog/arcus-incident-analysis",
      "says": "Reconciles account records and bridge payouts, and explains the limits of its root-cause reconstruction.",
      "primary": true
    }
  ],
  "headline": null,
  "one_liner": null,
  "in_the_wild_note": "Arcus confirms the unauthorized withdrawal and says it deployed an accounting fix.",
  "mitigation": null,
  "timeline": [
    {
      "date": "Nov 10, 2026",
      "title": "A new account exploits subaccount transfers",
      "body": "Arcus dates the start to approximately 10:07 PM ET on November 9 (03:07 UTC on November 10)."
    },
    {
      "date": "Nov 10, 04:07 UTC",
      "title": "Arcus pauses withdrawals",
      "body": "The bridge had already limited further payouts."
    },
    {
      "date": "Nov 10, 04:37 UTC",
      "title": "Arcus deploys the fix",
      "body": "The team subsequently blocks the exploiting addresses."
    },
    {
      "date": "Nov 10, 09:26 UTC",
      "title": "Arcus reopens withdrawals",
      "body": "At 10:02 UTC it reverses the blocked withdrawal requests."
    },
    {
      "date": "Nov 10, 2026",
      "title": "Arcus discloses the incident and covers the shortfall",
      "body": "Arcus reports using its own treasury and tracking the withdrawn funds."
    },
    {
      "date": "Nov 11, 01:24 UTC",
      "title": "Ethereum multisig transaction relays a return offer",
      "body": "The message proposes returning 90% and keeping 10%, with a deadline of November 13 at 01:00 UTC. The transaction documents an offer."
    },
    {
      "date": "Nov 12, 2026",
      "title": "CertiK reconstructs payouts and finds an accounting anomaly",
      "body": "Nine on-chain payments total 2,234,391 USDG. The saved account records show a pattern consistent with signed 64-bit wraparound. The layer responsible remains unknown."
    }
  ],
  "body_markdown": "Arcus attributes the incident to an accounting error in transfers between a user’s own subaccounts. It has not published the exact triggering conditions or a user-side patch. The 2,234,391 USDG was paid out. The other roughly $3 million was only requested. Treasury coverage made up the shortfall while the withdrawn funds were still being tracked. Arcus says trading and withdrawals are operating normally and that other users’ balances, positions and orders were unaffected.\n\n**November 11 recovery offer.** A message claiming to be from the Arcus team appeared on Ethereum and was repeated in a successful Safe transaction at **01:24 UTC**. It offered the recipient the option to return **90%** of the withdrawn funds and keep **10%**, with a deadline of **November 13 at 01:00 UTC**. The transaction establishes that the message was relayed, and Arcus’s incident report remains the source for the amount paid out and treasury coverage. There is no confirmed return in the sources reviewed. The Safe call addressed the wallet Arcus disclosed and two additional addresses. Receipt of that message alone does not establish the addresses’ ownership. Arcus users should verify any recovery notice through the official interface.\n\n**November 12 technical analysis.** CertiK matched nine BridgeVault payouts on Robinhood Chain totaling **2,234,391 USDG**. Six other applied requests totaling **3,000,000 USDG** had no matching payout through finalized block **111,322,906**. It identified three exact signed 64-bit wraparound discrepancies in saved account records. The records establish the accounting anomaly and actual payments. The layer where the wrapping occurred and the value used by the collateral check remain unknown. CertiK also traces Relay refunds back to the incident wallet. Those transfers do not establish a return to Arcus."
}