The project’s November 1 warning is an actionable containment request for operators of a self-hosted payment system. Reports of actual wallet sweeps support L4, while the investigation remains preliminary. The initial alert did not establish how many instances were affected, how much was taken, whether every hot wallet is exposed, or whether the entry point is software, credentials or a deployment component.
Do not infer that cold wallets, every Lightning deployment or the Bitcoin network were compromised. The initial warning named no vulnerability identifier or release. The November 2 observations below narrow the reported version range; they do not establish a complete host-recovery procedure.
November 2 scope update: The project now identifies an attack path against 2.4.1 and older. Dorier reports attackers logging in as administrators, with the entry method still unknown. The project has no credible hot-wallet drain reports on 2.4.7; Dorier says its public servers on that version were not attacked and urges regular updates and small hot-wallet balances. These statements narrow the observed scope without proving all newer instances safe or linking the incident to a specific August vulnerability. Vendor-confirmed loss totals, affected-instance counts and complete recovery instructions remain unconfirmed. A separate complete Dorier post reports traces of pre-2.4.2 vulnerabilities, but does not identify which flaw or combination enabled the admin access.
November 2 tracing update: Bitquery’s original investigation estimates about $1.63 million, approximately 18.38 BTC and 3405 LTC, from 682 sweep transactions. It counts 267 sweeps after the public alert, worth about $150,000 at its chosen prices. These researcher figures have not been independently verified and are not a final project-confirmed loss figure. The count cannot identify servers or people: repeated sweeps may involve the same operator.
Bitcoin coverage ends at block 974216 (November 2, 05:42 UTC); Litecoin coverage ends at 06:00 UTC. The estimate covers the named collection addresses, excludes Lightning and other coins, and leaves out 0.26 BTC received by an associated wallet without reaching the named collector. It values the coins at $78,326/BTC and $55.54/LTC; another valuation date changes the dollar estimate. Bitquery reports more than 99% still in addresses first used in the theft at its cutoff. This is not evidence that funds were frozen, returned or recoverable, and an unlabeled payout address is not proof of an exchange deposit.
The project separately confirms that some hosting providers automatically shut down older instances. Verify your own service state with the provider before any restart; that notice supplies no complete host-cleanup or funds-recovery procedure.
Full November 2 report, verified November 3: This supersedes the earlier incomplete recovery guidance and uncertainty over linkage to the August flaw. BTCPay confirms a different method against the vulnerability fixed in 2.4.2. Servers already at 2.4.2 or later when the November 1 warning was issued showed no observed impact from these attacks. Older installs, including those upgraded only afterward, should move to a fresh VM and new-seed wallet even without visible theft; signs of compromise trigger the same response regardless of present version. Keys kept off the server were unaffected by these thefts, but older-server rebuilding still applies. The project publishes the same BTC/LTC collector addresses and explicitly warns that earlier activity and unresolved attribution prevent treating their balances/history as confirmed losses. Bitquery’s separate estimate above remains source- and time-bounded, not a vendor-confirmed total.
November 6 identifier and scope cross-check: The November 5 CVE record adds an identifier for the August-fixed LND macaroon flaw. The August advisory says ordinary BTCPay on-chain hot wallets and other Lightning implementations are outside that specific credential path; LND’s own on-chain funds can still be exposed. The separate November 2 report explicitly describes a different exploitation method and BTC/LTC hot-wallet thefts. Do not use the August exclusion to declare those older servers safe or infer that all November sweeps were LND withdrawals. Preserve the fresh-VM, new-seed and credential-replacement instructions and the unverified tracing limits above.