L4 · Septic Tank Blewzero-day · VPN · edge deviceivanti-connect-secure-chain

Ivanti Connect Secure: root on a patched VPN, for the nth time

Ivanti Connect Secure zero-day chain: unauthenticated root on fully patched VPN boxes, again

Attacker UTA0576 chained an auth bypass, a file write and a privilege escalation to take over VPN appliances running the latest release, then went after AD credentials, LAPS passwords and BitLocker keys. CISA added it to KEV the same day.

Disclosed
Oct 13, 2026
Public disclosure date
Severity
CVSS 8.6
1 CVE tracked here
Splash zone
Internet-facing Ivanti Connect Secure 22.8R2.4, 25.1.1.1, 25.1.2.2 and earlier
ivanti
In the wild
Yes
Exploited since early October; in CISA KEV

The one-sentence version

Send one magic header to skip the login, write a file through an update CGI, then use a local bug to become root: three steps, zero passwords, on the box that guards your network.

What happened

Volexity found the attacker, tracked as UTA0576, on a Connect Secure appliance running 22.8R2.4, the latest version at the time. The chain:

  1. Auth bypass through the X-DSCGI-PATH header
  2. File write → code execution in wu.cgi (1 and 2 together are CVE-2026-104935, CVSS 8.6)
  3. Privilege escalation in dsinvoked, which has no public CVE and was still unpatched at disclosure

The attacker left no web shell. It simply re-exploited the box for every command and tampered with logs to get past Ivanti’s internal Integrity Checker. From there it went after LDAP/AD credentials, LAPS passwords and BitLocker keys, and ran Kerberoasting.

Volexity has medium confidence that the actor used LLMs to build its tooling, and low confidence that it is criminal rather than espionage. Ivanti’s own advisory was not reachable for our review. The fixed-version list comes from secondary press, so double-check it against Ivanti’s portal.

What’s in the bowl

CVE-2026-104935CVSS 8.6

Auth bypass + arbitrary file write

Covers two of the three chained bugs: an authentication bypass via the X-DSCGI-PATH header and a file write in wu.cgi that leads to code execution.

In plain poop: the bouncer lets in anyone wearing a lanyard, and the lanyard is printed on the door.

Fixed versions

ProductSafe fromNote
Ivanti Connect Secure 22.822.8R2.5
Ivanti Connect Secure 25.125.1.1.2 / 25.1.3.0 / 25.1.3.1
Privilege escalation in dsinvokednoneNo CVE, no patch at disclosure. Fix promised “in coming weeks”

Crime-scene timeline

  1. Oct 1, 2026

    Earliest exploitation

    According to Defused Cyber honeypots and Volexity's Koessel. Volexity's blog says Oct 3.

  2. Oct 5, 2026

    Volexity starts investigating a compromised appliance

    The box ran 22.8R2.4, the latest release at the time.

  3. Oct 13, 2026

    Ivanti patches; Volexity publishes; CISA adds it to KEV

  4. Oct 14, 2026

    Previdian logs 105 exploit attempts from 50 IPs

  5. Oct 16, 2026

    CISA deadline for US federal agencies

Who said what

We list each claim and who made it. Primary sources (the vendor, the researcher, the registry) are marked. Where reports disagree, we grade by the worst credible case.