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L4 · Septic Tank BlewPlerdy · Mobile · Supply chainpoisoned-source-mobile

Poisoned Source mobile exploit campaign uses compromised sites, lookalikes and Plerdy analytics

Sekoia reports Poisoned Source delivering patched iOS/Android exploits through websites, lookalikes and Plerdy’s August–September script compromise. It assesses an APT29 link with moderate-to-high confidence. Plerdy confirms server/contact-data access but no known visitor compromise; infection totals are unknown.

Disclosed
Nov 4, 2026
Updated Nov 6, 2026
Severity
Septic Tank Blew
8 CVEs tracked here
Splash zone
Unpatched mobile visitors to campaign pages or sites loading poisoned Plerdy code August 27–September 3; exposure is not proof of infection.
Plerdy · Mobile · Supply chain
In the wild
Yes
Sekoia documents deployed exploit delivery; no confirmed visitor-infection total is given.

What happened

The November 4 disclosure covers the wider campaign; Plerdy’s earlier component notice is not a new November intrusion. Its script was one vector alongside direct injections and lookalike reverse proxies. Sekoia inferred the Plerdy fingerprinting link from matching filenames and redirects because that host was offline; Plerdy says no visitor compromise is known. Hundreds/thousands of tracker-loading sites are exposure estimates, not infected-device counts. Attribution remains Sekoia’s assessment. No final victim total or confirmed card theft is established. L4 reflects documented operational exploit delivery; a fully updated device is outside the recovered n-day chains, not immune to every attack.

What’s in the bowl

CVE-2025-43529

Class A/B WebKit entry

Known, previously patched flaw used in a recovered mobile exploit chain; not a newly disclosed zero-day.

Class A pointer-authentication bypass

Known, previously patched flaw used in a recovered mobile exploit chain; not a newly disclosed zero-day.

CVE-2026-20700

Class B pointer-authentication bypass

Known, previously patched flaw used in a recovered mobile exploit chain; not a newly disclosed zero-day.

CVE-2025-14174

Class B first sandbox-escape step

Known, previously patched flaw used in a recovered mobile exploit chain; not a newly disclosed zero-day.

CVE-2025-43510

Class B second sandbox-escape step

Known, previously patched flaw used in a recovered mobile exploit chain; not a newly disclosed zero-day.

CVE-2025-43520

Class B kernel privilege escalation

Known, previously patched flaw used in a recovered mobile exploit chain; not a newly disclosed zero-day.

CVE-2026-3910

Class C Chrome entry

Known, previously patched flaw used in a recovered mobile exploit chain; not a newly disclosed zero-day.

CVE-2025-27038

Class C Android escalation

Known, previously patched flaw used in a recovered mobile exploit chain; not a newly disclosed zero-day.

Crime-scene timeline

  1. Aug 27, 2026

    Plerdy’s script-compromise window begins

  2. Sep 3, 2026

    Plerdy removes unauthorized tracking code

    The vendor says server credentials were replaced; passwords and all sessions were reset/ended September 4.

  3. Nov 4, 2026

    Sekoia publishes the wider Poisoned Source campaign

    The report links three delivery vectors and recovered iOS/Android chains; attribution is a moderate-to-high-confidence assessment, not proof every visitor was infected.

  4. Nov 6, 2026

    Plerdy updates its public response

    It confirms stolen administrator credentials, customer contact-data access and prior resets, says no visitor compromise is known, and offers technical indicators to customers.

Who said what

We list each claim and who made it. Primary sources (the vendor, the researcher, the registry) are marked. Where reports disagree, we grade by the worst credible case.