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L4 · Septic Tank BlewDeFi · Arcus · accountingarcus-subaccount-withdrawals

Arcus subaccount accounting bug enabled a 2,234,391 USDG withdrawal

Arcus says a newly created account inflated its recorded balance through transfers between its own subaccounts. It withdrew 2,234,391 USDG. The bridge held another roughly $3 million in requests, which were reversed. Arcus covered the shortfall from its treasury.

Disclosed
Nov 10, 2026
Updated Nov 13, 2026
Severity
Septic Tank Blew
No CVE: a breach, not a bug
Splash zone
Arcus exchange accounting for transfers between subaccounts. Arcus reports one exploiting account and no affected user balances.
DeFi · Arcus · accounting
In the wild
Yes
Arcus confirms the unauthorized withdrawal and says it deployed an accounting fix.

What happened

Arcus attributes the incident to an accounting error in transfers between a user’s own subaccounts. It has not published the exact triggering conditions or a user-side patch. The 2,234,391 USDG was paid out. The other roughly $3 million was only requested. Treasury coverage made up the shortfall while the withdrawn funds were still being tracked. Arcus says trading and withdrawals are operating normally and that other users’ balances, positions and orders were unaffected.

November 11 recovery offer. A message claiming to be from the Arcus team appeared on Ethereum and was repeated in a successful Safe transaction at 01:24 UTC. It offered the recipient the option to return 90% of the withdrawn funds and keep 10%, with a deadline of November 13 at 01:00 UTC. The transaction establishes that the message was relayed, and Arcus’s incident report remains the source for the amount paid out and treasury coverage. There is no confirmed return in the sources reviewed. The Safe call addressed the wallet Arcus disclosed and two additional addresses. Receipt of that message alone does not establish the addresses’ ownership. Arcus users should verify any recovery notice through the official interface.

November 12 technical analysis. CertiK matched nine BridgeVault payouts on Robinhood Chain totaling 2,234,391 USDG. Six other applied requests totaling 3,000,000 USDG had no matching payout through finalized block 111,322,906. It identified three exact signed 64-bit wraparound discrepancies in saved account records. The records establish the accounting anomaly and actual payments. The layer where the wrapping occurred and the value used by the collateral check remain unknown. CertiK also traces Relay refunds back to the incident wallet. Those transfers do not establish a return to Arcus.

Crime-scene timeline

  1. Nov 10, 2026

    A new account exploits subaccount transfers

    Arcus dates the start to approximately 10:07 PM ET on November 9 (03:07 UTC on November 10).

  2. Nov 10, 04:07 UTC

    Arcus pauses withdrawals

    The bridge had already limited further payouts.

  3. Nov 10, 04:37 UTC

    Arcus deploys the fix

    The team subsequently blocks the exploiting addresses.

  4. Nov 10, 09:26 UTC

    Arcus reopens withdrawals

    At 10:02 UTC it reverses the blocked withdrawal requests.

  5. Nov 10, 2026

    Arcus discloses the incident and covers the shortfall

    Arcus reports using its own treasury and tracking the withdrawn funds.

  6. Nov 11, 01:24 UTC

    Ethereum multisig transaction relays a return offer

    The message proposes returning 90% and keeping 10%, with a deadline of November 13 at 01:00 UTC. The transaction documents an offer.

  7. Nov 12, 2026

    CertiK reconstructs payouts and finds an accounting anomaly

    Nine on-chain payments total 2,234,391 USDG. The saved account records show a pattern consistent with signed 64-bit wraparound. The layer responsible remains unknown.

Who said what

We list each claim and who made it. Primary sources (the vendor, the researcher, the registry) are marked. Where reports disagree, we grade by the worst credible case.